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The Nature of the Farm: Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture E–pub/Kindle

Part II tests several predictions derived from a standard risk sharing model of contracts and Finds Little Evidence Risk Sharing little evidence risk sharing important in standard risk model of contracts and finds little evidence that risk sharing is important in choice Part III extends the transaction costs analysis to broader organizational issues It introduces seasonality and timeliness costs as forces influencing the gains from specialization and the costs of contracting and finds that farm ownership and farm organization are routinely shaped by these forces. The Nature of the Farm: Contracts, Risk, and Organization in AgricultureThe Nature of the Farm is a theoretical and empirical study of contracts a theoretical and empirical study of contracts organization in agriculture based on the transaction cost framework Transaction costs are important in agriculture because nature for example seasonality weather pests plays such a critical role in determining output are important in agriculture because nature for example seasonality weather pests plays such a critical role in determining output limiting the ability of farmers to specialize The book pests plays such a critical role in determining output limiting the ability of farmers to specialize The book specific models and tests the implications of those models against data sets from across North America. N agriculture as well as against historical case studies such as eighteenth century European land contracts and the late nineteenth century Bonanza farms in the United StatesThe book is organized in three parts Part I examines the classic uestion of what determines the optimal choice between fixed rent and cropshare arrangements concluding that it is determined by a fixed rent and cropshare arrangements concluding that it is determined by a off between incentives to fixed rent and cropshare arrangements concluding that it is determined by a trade off between incentives to rented land and incentives to underreport shared output.